We study the effect of limited access to capital on firm cost stickiness, using data from a large sample of Chinese private firms over 1998-2007. Our results show that on average SG&A costs are anti-sticky. For firms in regions with lower levels of financial development, SG&A costs have lower sensitivity to sales increases and exhibit lower stickiness. Overall our findings suggest access to capital as an important determinant of cost stickiness.
Introduction
In a perfect market, firms adjust their costs symmetrically according to activity changes (e.g., Horngren et al., 2012) . However, previous empirical studies focus on publicly traded firms and document that costs are sticky -costs increase more when activity rises than decrease when activity falls by the same amount (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Banker et al., 2013; Banker and Byzalov, 2014) . The implicit assumption in these studies is that firms can keep unutilized resources, which is generally true for those firms that have good access to capital (Reid and Smith, 2000; Holzhacker et al., 2015) . However, this assumption may not hold for privately held and small firms with limited access to capital, and for such firms, it is uncertain whether cost stickiness is prevalent. Using a unique, large sample from China that includes only privately-held small firms, we extend previous literature by documenting that on average selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs are anti-sticky for small private firms, and firms with better access to capital have stronger cost stickiness or weaker anti-stickiness.
Private firms do not have access to public equity markets, and Chinese private firms mainly rely on bank loans for external financing. Although we focus on small and private firms, these firms play an important role in various economies. For instance, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the US account for more than half of the private sector output, employ more than half of private sector workers, and provide 60%-80% of new jobs each year (Ou, 2006) . Similarly, SMEs in China account for about 60% of the market value of all industrial final products produced (Li, 2009 ). Mitchell and Reid (2000) argue that prior studies predominantly focus on management accounting in large firms and have long ignored the specifics of management accounting in SMEs.
We consider financing costs associated with limited access to capital as an important type of adjustment costs that affect cost behaviour (Doms and Dune, 1998; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003) .
As established in the literature, asymmetric adjustment costs 1 , as well as deliberate managerial decisions, are the main explanations of cost stickiness (Banker and Byzalov, 2014) . When firms reduce their capacity as sales decrease, they incur adjustment costs such as severance pay to terminate employment contracts, social pressures from media and regulators, and costs of fire sale of equipment and machines. When firms expand capacity in response to sales increase, they incur adjustment costs such as the costs of hiring and training new employees, the transaction costs of purchasing equipment and machines, and financing costs to obtain external financing (Bresnahan and Ramey, 1994; Doms and Dune, 1998; Cooper et al., 1999; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003) .
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In particular, firms with limited access to capital have higher costs of securing external financing during the capacity expansion periods 3 , which increases the upward adjustment costs.
When activity decreases, firms with limited access to capital may suffer more decrease in the present value of revenue generated by a marginal capacity, as these firms have higher opportunity cost of capital and thus higher discount rates compared to firms with better access to capital.
Therefore, we hypothesize that limited access to capital not only reduces contemporary capacity expansions associated with sales increases, but also weakens the degree of cost stickiness when sales decrease.
To test our hypotheses, we exploit the regional financial development index in China, which is compiled by the National Economic Research Institute of China (Fan et al., 2010) . Our 3 approach is based on the findings of prior studies that financial development levels have a major impact on firms' access to capital (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Love, 2003) . This approach has the following advantages. First, the credit market in China is dominated by state-owned banks, so macro-level factors such as monetary policy, government intervention, and financial development have significant effects on firms' access to capital . Second, regional financial development is relatively exogenous to firmlevel managerial decisions, whereas prior studies that use firm-level proxies for access to capital usually suffer a more serious endogeneity problem (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) . 4 Third, we focus on inter-region variations within one country, and hence, our sample is not subject to contamination of different accounting rules, taxation, and investor protection across countries.
Our sample is extracted from the Annual Industrial Survey Database complied by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). After dropping observations with a few standard criterions in cost stickiness literature, which we discuss in detail in the third section, our final sample consists of 241,982 firms over the period of [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Although all firms in our sample are not publicly traded, firms covered in our sample contribute to more than 90% of the industrial GDP of China. This database is suitable for our study because firms covered in the database do not have access to equity markets. 5 Firms in our sample are also relatively smaller than firms studied in most prior cost stickiness literature. While bank loans are a major source of external financing for our sample firms, small firms in our sample usually have severe asymmetric information and weak bargaining power in the negotiations of bank loans. As a result, it is more difficult and costly for privately-held small firms to obtain external capital (e.g., Fazzari et al., 4 1988; Peterson and Rajan, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006) . This problem is more pronounced for firms located in regions with lower levels of financial development. In particular, state-owned banks dominate the credit market in China, and they have stringent credit rationing and strong lending discrimination against privately held small firms (Bhabra et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009 ).
Consistent with our hypotheses, our empirical results indicate that firms in regions with lower financial development not only have less contemporary capacity expansion associated with sales growth, but also have weaker cost stickiness. Our results also show that on average SG&A costs are anti-sticky. One possible explanation for the prevalence of cost anti-stickiness is that the overall level of financial development in China is relatively low over our sample period, and firms in our sample are private and small. In other words, on average our sample firms have limited access to capital.
While we interpret the results as evidence for the importance of access to capital in determining cost behavior, there are two alternative explanations. First, China's unique legal, economic institutions and industry characteristics may be the driver of cost stickiness. To test this explanation, we analyse public firms in China that are in the same industries as our sample firms.
The alternative explanation should apply to these firms, and we would expect to find cost antistickiness for these firms. However, we find that costs are sticky for these firms, suggesting that China's unique legal, economic institutions and industry characteristics are not likely to be the driver of the cost anti-stickiness in our sample. Second, it could be that the nature of being private alone is the driver of cost anti-stickiness. If this alternative explanation holds, we would expect anti-stickiness for all private firms. However, we find that for larger private firms, who have better access to capital, costs are sticky, suggesting that being private alone is not likely to be the driver of the cost anti-stickiness we document.
Our results are robust to a variety of different specifications, including different proxies for access to capital. In particular, we also take advantage of the 2004 Chinese macroeconomic regulation as an exogenous shock to firms' external financing costs, and find that firms have a lower degree of cost stickiness in 2004 relative to 2003, and the effect is more pronounced for the five industries that are more heavily influenced by the regulations on lending.
Our study contributes to cost stickiness literature by showing that access to capital, a factor that was largely ignored before, affects cost behavior and managerial cost commitment decisions. Anderson et al. (2003) and Banker et al. (2013) use asset intensity, employee intensity, and the strictness of country-level employee protection laws as proxies for different adjustment costs, and find these proxies to be positively related to cost stickiness. Based on a large sample of private firms in China, we find that both the contemporary capacity expansion associated with activity increase and cost stickiness will be reduced when firms have more limited access to capital. In addition, our paper provides empirical evidence that SMEs exhibit different cost stickiness from large public firms due to the limited access to capital.
Our paper also sheds light on cost stickiness in China, an increasingly important economy in the world. The majority of the prior management accounting literature studies public firms in developed countries, while developing countries such as China, Brazil, Russia and Latin American countries are rarely studied (López and Hiebl, 2015) . Furthermore, the management accounting practice of SMEs may be different between China and developed countries. Allen et al. (2005) find that it is difficult to explain Chinese economy growth by theories built upon developed economies. Anderson et al. (2003) and Calleja et al. (2006) document cost stickiness for US, UK, French, and German public firms, while Dall Via and Perego (2013) study SMEs in Italy and find evidence of cost anti-stickiness. More recently, Banker and Byzalov (2014) examine public firms in an international setting and find that China has the highest degree of cost stickiness among twenty economies. Gu et al. (2016) find that the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have a higher degree of cost stickiness than non-SOEs, and such effects are stronger for SOEs with political connections and in regions with weak institutions and more political intervention. But Gu et al. (2016) only examine public firms in China and focus on the effect of political intervention on cost stickiness. While both Banker and Byzalov (2014) and Gu et al. (2016) examine public firms in China, we extend the previous cost stickiness literature by studying a large sample of Chinese private firms with various abilities to get access to capital.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 discusses our sample, data, and empirical methods. Main empirical evidence and additional tests are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Literature and hypotheses
It is widely assumed in cost accounting textbooks that the change in costs is symmetric to the change in the level of activities (Noreen, 1991) . However, Cooper and Kaplan (1992) and Noreen and Soderstrom (1997) question the validity of the assumption of cost symmetry and argue that costs can be asymmetric due to the adjustment costs and other market frictions. Consistent with this prediction, Anderson et al. (2003) study a sample of US public firms and find that when activity changes by the same amount, SG&A costs increase more when activity rises than decrease when activity falls. Following Anderson et al. (2003) , Calleja et al. (2006) , and Banker and Byzalov (2014) document cost stickiness in the public firm samples from the other countries.
A common theme in the previous literature is that firms incur adjustment costs to change the levels of labor forces or the capacity of equipment and machines (e.g., Bresnahan and Ramey, 7 1994; Doms and Dune, 1998; Cooper et al., 1999; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003) . And adjustment costs may differ for capacity reduction and for capacity expansion, causing costs to change asymmetrically (e.g., Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003; Ye and Duenyas, 2007) .
It is worth noting that prior studies of cost stickiness implicitly assume that firms have sufficient access to capital (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) . Under this assumption, the studies focus on other types of adjustment costs and expect the adjustment costs to be smaller for capacity expansion than for capacity reduction (e.g., Jaramillo et al., 1993; Pfann and Palm, 1993; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003) . Consistent with this expectation, previous empirical studies examine publicly traded firms and show evidence that costs are sticky (Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006) .
However, these studies examine publicly traded firms, which are generally larger and more established. For such firms the implicit assumption is more likely to hold, and adjustment costs are more likely to be higher for capacity reduction than for capacity expansion, consistent with the expectation of stickiness. Consequently, it remains unclear whether costs exhibit the same asymmetry for firms with limited access to capital.
Firms with limited access to capital have difficulty in securing external financing and usually pay high costs of capital. As such, limited access to capital not only restrains capacity expansion when activity increases, but also reduces cost stickiness when activity decreases. Below, we illustrate the role of limited access to capital using labor hiring as an example:
1. Higher capacity expansion costs: to make hiring decisions associated with activity increases, managers trade the present value of revenue generated by the marginal worker against the hiring costs. Firms with limited access to capital have higher external financing costs than firms with good access to capital. All else being equal, firms with limited access to capital are likely to 8 have larger hiring costs and fewer contemporary new hires associated with activity increases, due to the difficulty of raising external capital to fund the expansion.
2. Higher opportunity cost of capital: the discount rate used for calculating the present value of the revenue generated by the marginal worker should be the firm's opportunity cost of capital. Firms with limited access to capital have higher opportunity cost of capital than firms with good access to capital. All else being equal, firms with limited access to capital have the lower present value of revenue generated by the marginal worker. All other things being equal, firms with limited access to capital would have fewer contemporary new hires associated with activity increases. Similarly, to make firing decisions associated with activity decreases, managers trade the reduced present value of revenue generated by the marginal worker against current firing costs.
All else being equal, firms with limited access to capital would fire more workers associated with activity decreases.
3. Higher costs to retain slack resource: one important explanation of cost stickiness is that managers retain slack resources not only to save on current period firing costs, but also to reduce future hiring costs if sales recover in subsequent periods (Weiss, 2010) . When firms have limited access to capital, it would be more difficult to retain unutilized workers especially when activity decreases (Holzhacker et al., 2015) . Opler et al. (1998) find that firms with limited access to capital tend to hold higher ratios of cash to total non-cash assets. Therefore, firms with high external financial costs may choose to remove excess capacity for the precautionary reason. All else being equal, firms with limited access to capital would retain less slack resources, which would reduce cost stickiness.
The above argument also applies when firms adjust their equipment and machines according to the activity changes. Importantly, adjustment costs of expanding capacity may 9 involve securing external financing (Doms and Dune, 1998; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003) , leading to very high adjustment costs associated with financing for firms with limited access to capital.
And firms with limited access to capital have difficulty in keeping unutilized resources.
Although the effect of limited access to capital on cost stickiness depends on legal and financial institutions of individual economies, we argue that this effect may be more pronounced in China. Despite the high economic growth over the past few decades, China's financial markets are still less established than developed economies (Allen et al., 2005) . For instance, only a small portion of large SOEs have received the approval for issuing public corporate bonds from the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Private funds in China are only in the infant stage. Thus, bank loans are the main source of external financing for most
Chinese firms. However, state-owned banks dominate Chinese credit market, and they have stringent credit rationing and strong lending discrimination against privately-held small and non-SOE firms (Bhabra et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009) . As a result, it is much more difficult for privatelyheld small and non-SOE firms to obtain loans from Chinese state-owned banks than for publicly traded large and SOE firms.
In summary, compared to firms with better access to capital, firms with limited access to capital are likely to expand capacity less as sales increase, and reduce capacity more as sales decrease. 6 In other words, we expect limited access to capital to not only reduce contemporary capacity expansion associated with activity increase, but also lower the degree of cost stickiness.
Thus, we have the following hypotheses: global financial crisis. In total, our sample includes 616,796 unique firms, with a total number of 2,228,727 firm-year observations. The NBSC mainly collect the firm characteristic data such as firm ownership and accounting data such as total assets, total debts, sales, and operating profits.
The accuracy of the data has been confirmed in the previous literature, for example, Chuang and Hsu (2004) , Cull et al. (2009), and Li et al. (2009) . The firms in our sample represent more than 90% of the industrial GDP of China, suggesting that it is important on its own to understand cost accounting practices of these firms.
The Annual Industrial Survey Database is suitable for our study on the relationship between access to capital and firm cost stickiness for three reasons. Frist, 99.8% of the firms in the database are privately held. Private firms have little access to equity markets and mainly rely on bank loan 11 finance in China. Secondly, the firms in the database differ greatly in firm size. And most of them are small. Previous literature have documented that small and privately held firms have more difficulties to get bank loans from Chinese banks than stated-owned and publicly listed firms (Bhabra et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009) . Therefore firms in our sample may have limited access to capital markets. Thirdly, our sample firms are located in 31 regions 8 , which include 4 municipalities, 5 autonomous regions and 22 provinces. The levels of financial market development across these regions are quite different, which is suitable for our study on the effect of exogenous limited access to capital on cost stickiness.
Although privately-held small and non-SOE firms have limited access to capital, they might be affiliated with business groups and such structure provides internal capital market for those firms (e.g., Fan et al. 2011) . Using an annual survey conducted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which includes the information on each firm's group affiliation is from, He et al. (2013) find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an alternative financing channel among SOEs than among Non-SOEs. However, the majority of firms in our sample are non-SOEs, we show that when we limit our analyses to only non-SOEs, we still find the similar results. In addition, to the degree that the affiliation with a business group is stable over time, the inclusion of firm fixed effects in our regressions should mitigate the concern of the internal capital market within business groups. We still find the similar results after controlling for firm fixed effects. The other weakness of our sample is that we don't have detailed information for the measurement of access to capital used in literature studying public firms, such as firm-bank relationship.
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Similar to Anderson et al. (2003) and other studies, we delete firms with duplicate IDs, observations with missing financial and operating information as well as information on a firm's ownership structure, and observations with errors such as non-positive total assets, non-positive sales etc. We also delete observations in which SG&A costs are greater than sales revenue in the same year, and observations without sales revenue or SG&A costs data for two consecutive years.
Lastly, we delete all public firms from our sample. The final sample includes 241,982 firms and a total of 1,046,294 firm-year observations. SG&A costs, 9 sales revenue, and other financial variables for all firms in our sample are collected from the Annual Industrial Survey Database.
NBSC classify all firms covered in the Annual Industrial Survey Database into three main categories: mining and quarrying; manufacturing; and production; and supply of electricity, gas, and water. These three main categories are further divided into thirty-nine industries based on each firm's 2-digit standard industry classification (SIC) applied. The detailed information on the each industry definition can be found in the appendix.
Proxy for access to capital
Our study focuses on the relation between access to capital and cost stickiness. We use regional financial development as a proxy for access to capital, because previous studies find that 13 regional financial development has a positive effect on firms' ability to raise fund externally. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that well developed financial markets help a firm to mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems, hence lowering the firm's external financing cost. Consistent with this prediction, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that industries that are reliant on external financing show greater growth in financially developed countries. Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) find that firm growth financed by long-term external debt and equity is positively associated with the level of a country's financial development. Love (2003) finds that firms in developed countries with better financial development have better access to external capital and thus higher investment. Beck et al. (2004) and Ayyagari et al. (2011) also find that financial development can mitigate a firm's limited access to capital in emerging economies.
Specifically, we use the regional financial market development index, compiled by the National Economic Research Institute of China, as a relatively exogenous proxy for access to capital. 10 The National Economic Research Institute of China develops five indices to measure regional marketization level: the relationship between government and market; non-state owned economic market development; product marketization; factor market development; and market intermediary and law.
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The financial market development index is one of the four first-level sub-indices of factor market development. It measures the degree of competition in each regional financial market. The financial market development index is composed by two second-level sub-indices: financial lending allocation index and financial competition index. The financial lending allocation index is measured by the proportion of loans received by non-state owned firms to the total loans from 10 The index has been used by a number of prior studies (Wang et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009 ). 11 Two principles are followed when these indices are established. At first, each of these five indices has at least two first level sub-indices. And each first-level sub-index can indicate one fundamental characteristic of marketization within a certain time period. Unreported techniques are applied to eliminate any non-market related noises in these indices. Second, every index is measurable and based on reliable and objective data sources. Survey data is also used if actual data is unavailable.
14 financial institutions. And the financial competition index is measured by the ratio of the amount deposited in non-state owned financial institutions to the total amount deposited in all financial institutions.
To calculate each sub-index, the National Economic Research Institute of China set a base year. According to the raw scores of the region in a particular criterion, a region with the highest (lowest) scores receives an index value of 10 (0) in the base year. Then, for the rest of regions, their index value is calculated by:
where Vi is region raw score on criterion i, Vmax is the highest raw score on criterion i, Vmin is the lowest raw score in criterion i.
To compare the index value over time, index value after the base year is calculated by: Although the regional financial development index does not directly measure access to capital at the firm-level, our approach offers a few advantages. Firstly, as the credit market in China is dominated by state-owned banks, macro-level factors such as monetary policy, government intervention, and financial development have significant effects on firms' external financing costs Chen et al., 2014) . Secondly, our proxy for access to capital at the region level suffers less of endogenous concerns compared with proxies of access to capital at the firm-level, such as leverage. Thirdly, we focus on different regions in one country and mitigate the confounding effects of cross-country differences in legal and political environments and accounting, tax, and financial policies. Finally, there are sufficient variations in financial developments across different regions in China. When China opened its economy in 1978, the Chinese government implemented an unbalanced development strategy. That is, to permit some people and some regions to become prosperous first, for the purpose of achieving common prosperity more quickly. Regions on the east coast of China received more favorable government policies and they also have geographical location advantages. Because of the higher return on investment on coastal regions, most domestic funds and foreign investments flowed into these regions. As a result, the economic and financial development gap has been widened between the coastal and inland regions during our sample period.
Descriptions of the sample
The summary statistics of our sample are reported in Table 1 . We winsorize all the accounting variables used in our empirical analyses on both sides by 0.5% to mitigate the possible outlier effect.
12 In order to facilitate the comparison of our sample and those of prior studies, we use the descriptive statistics reported in Anderson et al. (2003) as benchmarks. Anderson et al. (2003) , they still suggest that SG&A costs are important to cost management. Our data offers a unique setting to examine cost management in a large sample with sufficient variations in firm size.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that sales revenue declines for 31.64% of the firm-year observations in our sample and SG&A costs decrease for 37.97% of the sample firm-year observations. Both of these numbers are greater than the corresponding numbers (27.01% and 24.98%) in Anderson et al. (2003) , suggesting that decreases in sales and SG&A costs are more frequent in our sample than in Anderson et al. (2003) . Similarly, the magnitudes of the decreases are also larger in our sample than in theirs. For example, the mean decreases in sales revenue and SG&A costs in our sample are 23.14% and 26.55% respectively, whereas the corresponding numbers in their sample are 17.45% and 15.67%. In addition, sales decrease is smaller than SG&A decrease (23.14% vs. 26.55%) in our sample, while the opposite is true (17.5% vs. 15.67%) in the sample of Anderson et al. (2003) . Finally, decreases in sales and SG&A costs are more volatile in our sample than in Anderson et al (2003) . The standard deviation of the decrease in sales revenue (SG&A costs) is 20.27% (22.67%) in our sample and 18.64% (16.4%) in theirs, which might be explained by the fact that our sample firms are in an emerging market and face more volatile operating environment.
Panel C reports the summary statistics of the financial market index, and its two sub-indices: 
Analysis and results

Main analysis
Previous cost stickiness studies (Calleja et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Banker et al., 2013) normally use Anderson et al. (2003) regression as their basic model: 
The intuition of this regression model is to test the significance of the marginal effect of sales decrease on the sensitivity of SG&A cost changes to the sales revenue changes. In this model, Decrease_Dummyi,t is a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if sales revenue of firm i for period t decreases from period t-1, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of Decrease_Dummy (λ1) captures the direction of cost stickiness. When λ1 is significantly negative, the increase in SG&A associated with 1% sales increase is γ1 percent, while the decrease in SG&A costs associated with 1% sales decrease is γ1+ λ1 (<γ1 percent), suggesting that SG&A costs are sticky. On the other hand, when λ1 is significantly positive, the increase in SG&A costs associated with 1% sales increase is γ1 percent, while the decrease in SG&A costs associated with 1% sales decrease is γ1+ λ1 (>γ1 percent), suggesting that SG&A costs are anti-sticky. Industryi,t and Yeari,t are industry and year dummy variables.
We use heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for all regressions in this study because our sample includes a large number of firms with various firm characteristics. The first column in Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of model (1). Contrary to the previous findings that SG&A costs are sticky (e.g., Anderson et al. 2003) , we find a significantly positive λ1 in the whole sample, indicating that SG&A costs for our sample firms are anti-sticky. The estimated value of γ1 is 0.5540, indicating that SG&A costs rise by 0.55% per 1% increase in sales revenue 14 .
The estimated value of λ1 is 0.0116, indicating that SG&A costs fall by γ1+ λ1= 0.5656, or about 0.57% per 1% decrease in sales revenue. The results show that SG&A costs decrease significantly more when activity falls than they increase when activity rises by the same amount, indicating anti-stickiness of SG&A costs.
14 Although the coefficients on γ1 is higher than that in Anderson et al. (2003) , we argue that it is hard to compare the estimates of the two studies for a few reasons: 1) cross-sample comparisons of coefficients may not be appropriate, especially the within sample variable variances in our sample and Anderson et al. (2003) 's sample are different; 2) the definitions of the SG&A costs are not exactly the same between US and China; 3) we have public companies and SOEs, we re-estimate the coefficients after excluding these firms, and find the coefficient is lower than before; 4) legal and economic institutions are different between China and US.
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One possible explanation of cost anti-stickiness in our sample is that, as we discussed earlier, privately-held small and non-SOE firms have very limited access to external capital (Bhabra et al., 2008; Li et al., 2009 ). This situation is inconsistent with the implicit assumption made in prior studies that firms have sufficient access to capital (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) . To the credit of prior studies, which focus on publicly listed firms, this implicit assumption is more likely to be true, and these prior studies focus on other types of adjustment costs and expect the adjustment costs to be smaller for capacity expansion than for capacity reduction (e.g., Jaramillo et al., 1993; Pfann and Palm, 1993; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003) . Consistent with this expectation, previous empirical evidence shows that costs are sticky (Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006) .
However, for those small private firms with limited access to capital, their costs may be less sticky or even anti-sticky on average.
Meanwhile, there are two alternative explanations for anti-sticky costs: (1) China's unique legal, economic institutions and industry characteristics may lead to cost anti-stickiness; (2) Our sample firms are private. To rule out these two alternative explanations, we first collect all Chinese public firm data between 1998 and 2007 from China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and test our basic model (1) in this sample of Chinese public firms. Because the private firms in our sample are in three main industries (i.e., mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and production and supply of electricity, gas, and water), we first test public firms that are also in these three industries. Next, we test all public firms that are in the other industries.
The results in columns (2) -(4) of Panel A of Table 2 show cost stickiness in all Chinese public firms, suggesting that the anti-stickiness is unlikely to be driven by Chinese legal features and industry characteristics, since the legal features would apply to all Chinese firms, public and private, and the industry characteristics would affect to all firms in the same industries.
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Second, we divide our main sample into three subsamples by firm size, which is measured by the nature logarithm of total assets. We test the basic model (1) in these three subsamples. The results in Panel B of Table 2 show that SG&A costs are anti-sticky in the small firm sample, not sticky in the median firm sample, and sticky in the large firm sample. These results suggest that being private (i.e., not publicly traded) alone does not warrant anti-stickiness. Therefore it is unlikely that our finding is just driven by the fact that our sample firms are private.
To investigate the effect of access to capital on cost stickiness, we further specify γ1 and λ1 in model (1) 
We use three different definitions of the RFD variable in model (2). RFD1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is located in a region with the financial development index above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. RFD2 is the original value of the regional financial development index. And RFD3 is the natural logarithm of the regional financial development index. Similar to Banker et al. (2013) , we allow RFD to affect both the slope for revenue increases and the degree of cost stickiness in model (1). This is because access to capital may affect managerial decisions when sales decrease as well as when sales increase. The coefficient γ2 represents the effect of access to capital on the SG&A costs when sales increase. Our first hypothesis predicts γ2 to be positive.
Our second hypothesis predicts λ2 to be negative. Since λ1 is generally positive and antistickiness prevails in our sample, a negative λ2 implies that cost anti-stickiness becomes weaker as financial development reaches higher levels and firms have better access to capital. To express the same notion for stickiness, a negative λ2 implies that cost stickiness becomes stronger as financial development reaches higher levels and firms have better access to capital.
The results of model (2) in Table 3 are consistent with our hypotheses. For all three definitions of the RFD variable, γ2 is significantly positive, suggesting that in regions with higher levels of financial development, where firms have better access to capital, capacity expansion increases more as sales increase. In particular, γ2 on RFD1 is 0.0341, suggesting that when sales increase by 1%, SG&A costs of firms in the regions with the high financial market development index will grow 0.0341% more than the increase in SG&A costs of firms in the regions with the low financial market development index.
Similarly, λ2 is significantly negative at 1% level, indicating that firms located in the regions with higher levels of financial development have weaker anti-stickiness, or stronger degree of cost stickiness. In particular, λ2 on RFD1 is -0.0652, suggesting that when sales decrease by 1%, SG&A costs of firms in the regions with high financial market development index will drop 0.0652% less than the decrease of SG&A costs of firms in the regions with low financial market development index 16 .
We also replace the RFD variable by the second-level sub-index of financial competition index (RFC) and financial lending allocation (RLA), and then re-estimate the model (2) in the full sample and non-SOE sample. As shown in Table 4 , our results are robust with the RLA variable.
16 Among 1,046,294 firm-year observations in our sample, 322,181 firm-year observations are SOEs. We also separate our sample by SOEs and non-SOEs, and then test the model (2) in these two subsamples. We find that although in both SOEs and non-SOEs, λ2 is significantly negative, the absolute value of λ2 is significantly lower in SOEs than that in non-SOEs.
However, λ2 is not significant in the full sample when we replace the RFD variable by the RFC variable. The possible explanations are: (1) the financial competition may have both positive and negative effects on firms' access to capital (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Guzman, 2000; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Beck et al., 2004) ; (2) the financial competition index is measured as the ratio of the amount deposited in non-state owned financial institutions to the total amount deposited in all financial institutions. The index itself may not be a suitable proxy for access to capital.
As suggested by Anderson et al. (2003) , we further extend model (2) by including the following four control variables: Successive_Decreasei,t, Growthi,t, AIi,t, and EIi,t, respectively.
Similar to Anderson et al. (2003) , we define Successive_Decreasei,t as a dummy variable equal to 1 if revenue in period t-1 is less than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. Growthi,t is the percentage growth in real Chinese GNP during year t. AIi,t is the asset intensity defined as the assets to sales revenue ratio. EIi,t is the employee intensity defined as the employees to sales revenue ratio. To control for the different economy growth rates across regions, we also include the percentage growth of real GNP in each region (RGDP) as a control variable. Table 5 shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of more control variables. The extended model in Table 5 is defined as: 
In models (2) and (3), we simply define γ1 and λ1 in model (1) as a linear combination of the RFD variable and the other control variables. Following Banker et al. (2012) , we test model (2) and model (3) using two-way clustering by region and by year. 17 Results reported in Table 6 are not consistent with our first hypothesis but are consistent with our second hypothesis. Although the coefficient of RFD (γ2) is insignificant in a regression with two-way clustering by region and by year, the coefficient of RFD dummy (λ2) is significantly negative, supporting that firms in the regions with high financial development index have higher cost stickiness.
Our results are still consistent with both hypotheses when we replace the RFD variable by the RLA variable in models (2) and (3). Table 7 shows that γ2 on RLA is significantly positive, indicating that firms with better access to capital expand capacity more as sales increase. The results also show that λ2 on RLA is significantly negative at the 1% level, which is consistent with our expectation that firms with better access to capital have higher cost stickiness. The results thus far have established a robust link between access to capital and cost stickiness. We next further validate our approach in a different way. In our large panel data, we have firm observations over ten years and across 31 regions. It is natural to assume that error terms (εi,t) are correlated within each region and over the time dimension. We use the two-way clustered standard errors by region and by year based on the formula in Cameron and Miller (2011) . In this paper, we assume that firms in regions with different financial development levels would have different ability to get access to capital. Therefore we choose to cluster error terms by region, instead of by firm itself. And our two-way clustering method is robust to an arbitrary pattern of within-region correlations and an arbitrary pattern of serial correlation within each region. we expect the effect of the regulations to be stronger for these five industries than for the other industries.
The results in Table 8 indicate that for the full sample, the coefficient of TLR (γ2) is significantly negative when control variables are not included and insignificant when control variables are included. And the coefficient of TLR dummy (λ2) is always significantly positive, suggesting that firms in the period of more limited access to capital have lower cost stickiness.
Further results in Table 8 show that these effects are more pronounced for the five industries that are more heavily influenced by the regulations on lending. These results confirm our hypotheses 1 and 2.
Further robustness checks
We also conduct a set of additional tests and find similar results. 19 We also use the firm-level cost asymmetry measure in Weiss (2010), but do not find significant results. A possible reason is that when we adopt the Weiss (2010) cost asymmetry measure, we lose 97% of our observations, and only relatively large firms remain in the sample. While Weiss (2010) uses quarterly data, we only have yearly observations. To obtain the Weiss (2010) measure using yearly observations for a firm, the firm must 1) have data over at least three and up to five consecutive years, and 2) have sales and costs changing in the same direction. In our sample, only 3% of our firm-year observations, mainly from large firms, satisfy these two conditions simultaneously.
firm age, liquidity ratio, lagged changes in sales, product market competition 20 , magnitude of sales changes and aggregate sales and costs over longer periods following Anderson et al. (2003) . (2) Following Anderson and Lanen (2007) , we control for industry dummies and allow the coefficients to change across industries. (3) We control for cost structure by using the revised model of Balakrishan et al. (2015) . (4) (2015), we calculate the ratio of valueweighted total liabilities to total assets for all private firms in a province the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and the ratio of total bank loan to total GDP at year end for each province or province-level municipality respectively to obtain two alternative macro-level measures of access to capital. (9) We adjust the financial variables based on annual inflation rates. (10) We exclude the region with highest financial market development index value in each year.
Conclusions
Previous cost behavior literature studies publicly traded firms and document that costs are sticky (Anderson et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Banker et al., 2013) . We extend the literature by examining whether the findings of prior studies hold for private firms with limited access to external capital. Using a large sample of Chinese private firms, we show that SG&A costs are on average anti-sticky. We also find that firms with limited access to capital have lower contemporary capacity expansion associated with sales increase, as well as stronger cost anti-stickiness or weaker cost stickiness.
We contribute to the literature on cost behavior by showing how access to capital affects the direction and magnitude of cost stickiness. The results suggest that the stickiness of SG&A costs documented in prior studies that examine publicly traded, relatively large firms do not generalize to firms with limited access to capital, such as small and private firms in our sample.
This finding is important given that smaller firms play significant roles in many economies around the world. We also contribute to the literature by examining cost behavior in Chinese firms.
Despite the increasing importance of Chinese economy, our understanding of cost accounting practice in China is limited. Nevertheless, like most prior studies, due to data availability limitation and the endogeneity problem we use regional financial development index as a relatively exogenous proxy and are unable to measure access to capital directly. Future studies may seek to link firm financing costs to adjustment costs more directly to generate new insight into how external financing costs affect cost stickiness. In addition, anti-sticky costs cannot be derived by limited access to capital ex-ante and anti-sticky costs may be caused by multiple factors, limited access to capital is just one of those factors. Future studies may seek to incorporate other factors to explain the anti-sticky costs. 
This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue. The main sample includes 1,046,294 firm observations from the Annual Industrial Survey Database. We also include a sample of Chinese public firms for comparison. The full public sample includes 9,171 public firm-year observations during the period 1999-2007 (using CSMAR database). The matched industry sample includes all public firms from the same three industries as our main sample. Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are not reported. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue. We divide our main sample into three groups by firm size. Sizei,t is the nature logarithm of total assets of firm i for period t. Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are not reported. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Small
This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue including the effect of access to capital. The full sample includes 1,046,294 firm-year observations during the period 1999-2007. RFD1i,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is located in a region with financial development index above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. RFD2i,t is the original value of regional financial development index. RFD3i,t is natural logarithm of regional financial development index.
Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are not reported. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table presents the results of regressing changes in SG&A on changes in sales revenue including the effect of access to capital. The sample period is 1999-2007. FC/FLi,t are two dummy variables equal to 1 if a firm is located in regions with financial competition/financial lending index above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Decrease_Dummyi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the revenue of firm i for period t is less than that in the preceding period, and 0 otherwise. We estimate the regressions in the total sample and Non-SOE sample. The standard errors of all the regressions are estimated by Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
